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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.1 The Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 2009 
introduced pilots of direct elections to two Scottish Health Boards. As part of 
the evaluation of the pilots, this literature review was undertaken to gather 
evidence on a range of options used internationally to enhance public 
representation on Health Boards. In Scotland, the pilot elections are the latest 
in a series of measures which have aimed to increase public involvement and 
accountability in NHS decision-making. Measures introduced by previous 
administrations include a statutory duty for Boards to involve the public in 
decision-making, encouraging Boards to establish Public Partnership Forums, 
the inclusion of representatives of Local Councils on Boards, and establishing 
the Scottish Health Council to support engagement with the public. Since 
2007, as part of the agenda for a mutual NHS set out in Better Health, Better 
Care (The Scottish Government, 2007), the Government has introduced the 
Participation Standard to improve the collection of information on good 
practice and promote it, and increased opportunities for members of the public 
to ask questions at their Board’s Annual Review event.  
1.2  This literature review presents research evidence on methods of improving 
public representation on Health Boards: direct elections, alternative modes of 
appointment, and advisory committees. While there is a substantial literature 
on these topics, it does not necessarily offer evidence neatly packaged to 
inform policy-making. As others have acknowledged (Barnett & Clayden, 
2007), the primary research on Board elections mostly focuses on the views 
of Board members and so it is difficult to identify wider impacts. This reflects a 
broader preoccupation in the literature with accounts of process rather than 
assessments of outcomes (Mitton, Smith, Peacock, Evoy, & Abelson, 2009). 
Even where research looks at outcomes, the absence of objective measures 
of community engagement, and the problems with attributing outcomes to 
specific initiatives, mean that conclusions are rarely as clear as we might like 
(S. J. Lewis et al., 2001).  
 
1.3 The most directly comparable examples of direct elections to health bodies are 
some Canadian Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), New Zealand District 
Health Boards (DHBs), and Foundation Trusts in England. Evidence from 
these systems suggests that elections are not in themselves sufficient to 
ensure a high quality or quantity of public involvement.  
• Low electoral turnout was a challenge for both Foundation Trusts and 
Canadian RHAs, although turnout has been higher for DHBs in New 
Zealand.  
• Some Canadian provinces also had insufficient numbers of candidates, 
while in New Zealand candidate numbers have fallen but remained viable. 
There is some concern that candidate numbers for Foundation Trusts are 
on a downward trend. 
• Elections do not guarantee a more descriptively representative group of 
Board members. In New Zealand, the continued appointment of a minority 
of Board members is intended in part to ensure adequate representation of 
minorities.  
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However, fears that elected Boards will harm health services due to a lack of 
experience or to ‘political interference’ do not appear to have been realised. 
• Many voters seem to value health service experience more than finance or 
management skills when choosing candidates. Accordingly many elected 
Board members have a steep learning curve around financial and 
management issues. 
• The role of Board Chairs in supporting learning has been found to be of 
critical importance in each case. 
• Once in place, elected Board members have similar views to appointed 
Boards. There was no clear evidence that fears about the politicisation of 
Boards were realised in the three examples discussed.   
• The more public role of elected Board members can raise expectations 
about the degree of influence they have. Boards often focus mainly on day-
to-day management, with strategic policy-making remaining with central or 
provincial Government. In both New Zealand and Canada elected members 
were frustrated by these limitations on their influence. 
Where elections have been tried and then abandoned, as in Saskatchewan, it 
has generally been justified by reference to low turnout and financial cost, 
rather than to evidence of problems with Board functioning.  
 
1.4 One alternative to elections is to alter how Board members are recruited and 
appointed. There is a lack of research evidence on these techniques, but 
models which have been used include: 
• Quotas (Quebec hospital boards in the 1970s, New Zealand District Health 
Boards) or targets (Primary Care Trust Boards in England) for the 
representation of particular groups on Boards. 
• Rethinking advertising campaigns and supporting ‘near hit’ candidates to 
reapply (Primary Care Trust Boards in England) 
 
1.5  There are many examples of advisory bodies in the UK and in Canada, 
including Scotland’s current system of Public Partnership Forums. These are 
more thoroughly researched, particularly in the UK. Some themes from the 
literature include: 
• Advisory bodies are sometimes criticised for being weak, as by definition 
they don’t have direct decision-making control. It can be difficult to evaluate 
their level of influence. 
• As with appointed Boards, questions of representation arise repeatedly with 
advisory bodies. People with the confidence and time to take part are often 
older, and more middle class. Ethnic minorities and young people are often 
under-represented. Models of ‘drop-in drop-out’ participation such as LINks 
in the English NHS are seen as a solution to this, but have other drawbacks.  
 
1.6  International experience shows that neither elected nor advisory bodies can 
resolve all of the challenges of patient and public involvement; problems of low 
or intermittent engagement, questions about representativeness, and the cost-
effectiveness of any given strategy are common and do not seem to have any 
one solution.  
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2 AIMS, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS  
 
2.1  In theory, the accountability of health care providers in National Health Service 
systems is clear: it runs to the minister, who is in turn accountable to the 
legislature, which is in turn accountable to voters. However this has not always 
been perceived as successful in practice, and the history of the NHS shows 
repeated attempts to strengthen the links between local health care providers 
and members of the public. 
 
2.2 The Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 2009 
introduced pilots of direct elections to two Scottish Health Boards, and piloted 
two alternative models of appointing members in an additional two Health 
Boards. As part of the evaluation of the pilots, this literature review was 
undertaken to gather evidence on a range of options used internationally to 
enhance public representation on Health Boards. It presents research 
evidence on three methods of improving public representation on Health 
Boards: direct elections, alternative modes of appointment, and advisory 
committees. 
 
2.3 In Scotland, the pilot elections are the latest in a series of measures which 
have aimed to increase public involvement and accountability in NHS decision-
making. Measures introduced by previous administrations include a statutory 
duty for Boards to involve the public in decision-making, encouraging Boards 
to establish Public Partnership Forums, the inclusion of representatives of 
Local Councils on Boards, and establishing the Scottish Health Council to 
support engagement with the public. Since 2007, as part of the agenda for a 
mutual NHS set out in Better Health, Better Care (The Scottish Government, 
2007), the Government has introduced the Participation Standard to improve 
the collection of information on good practice and promote it, and increased 
opportunities for members of the public to ask questions at their Board’s 
Annual Review event. 
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3 CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
 
3.1  The evidence on public involvement comes from a variety of health systems 
and from the 1960s to the present day. Terminology varies across time and 
health systems. This section discussed three dimensions of public 
involvement. How can we categorise and what do we call the activities 
undertaken? Who should be involved through public involvement? What do 
policy-makers seek to achieve by involving the public? 
What? 
3.2 One study of cancer patients, cancer service staff and Health Board Chief 
Executives in Scotland found that involvement suggested very different 
activities to different people, including  
• Patient satisfaction questionnaires  
• Health professionals’ knowledge of their patients’ problems  
• Patients attending group sessions for support  
• In the case of Chief Executives, ‘getting the message across’ to the public 
(Forbat, Hubbard, & Kearney, 2009).  
The evidence base in this area is confused by the range of overlapping and 
sometimes ill-defined terminology. Since the 1960s there have been attempts 
to step back from the policy terminology of particular innovations and offer 
frameworks that categorise and assess activities. One of the best known 
conceptual models in this area is Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of participation’, 
which sought to distinguish activities which offered genuine empowerment, 
from those which were tokenistic or manipulative. Charles and Di Maio (1993) 
offered a simpler model. More recently, the concept of ‘co-production’, defined 
as “active involvement of the public in policy decision and/or service 
design/delivery” (S. Martin, 2009) has become more popular as a goal than 
ideas of citizen control.  
 
Author Arnstein 
(1969) 
Charles & Di 
Maio (1993) 
Rowe & Frewer 
(2005) 
Martin (2009) 
Concept ‘citizen 
participation’ 
‘lay 
participation’ 
‘public 
engagement’ 
‘public 
engagement’ 
 Levels manipulation     
therapy     
informing  public 
communication 
information  
consultation consultation public involvement consultation  
placation     
partnership partnership public participation co-production  
delegated power     
citizen control lay domination    
Table 1: Models of participation 
3.3 More recent work has questioned the relevance of these hierarchies. Tritter 
and McCallum (2006, p. 165) reject Arnstein’s ladder metaphor and propose 
instead a mosaic, arguing that  
“A linear, hierarchical model of involvement… fails to capture 
the dynamic and evolutionary nature of user involvement. Nor 
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does it recognise the agency of users who may seek different 
methods of involvement in relation to different issues and at 
different times. Similarly, Arnstein’s model does not 
acknowledge the fact that some users may not wish to be 
involved.”  
Some commentators have cautioned against a ‘more is better’ approach, 
focused solely on progressing ‘up the ladder’. Several empirical studies have 
explored patients’ preferences for involvement in different types of decision-
making, finding that ‘citizen control’ may not appeal to all, or even most, of the 
population (Litva, Canvin, Shepherd, Jacoby, & Gabbay, 2009; Litva et al., 
2002; Thompson, 2007). Church et al (2002) argue that ‘citizen governance’ 
type roles with time-consuming responsibilities appeal to a very small section 
of the population. They argue that more meaningful participation can take 
place “outside of the boardroom”. A helpful distinction in the Canadian 
literature is between citizen engagement (where authorities engage with the 
public to find out their preferences and needs) and citizen governance (where 
members of the public become part of the authority, taking on the work and 
responsibility of running a service) (Church, et al., 2002). 
 
Who?  
3.4 This literature review focuses on involving people as residents of a 
geographical area. Many (if not most) will be past, present or future service 
users, but their entitlement to be involved comes from their status as a 
member of the public. Public involvement activities have tended to attract 
participants from particular sections of the population, which can lead to 
concerns that only “the usual suspects” are involved (House of Commons - 
Health Committee, 2007). A ‘catch 22’ situation can arise where participants 
are expected to be both ‘ordinary’ members of the public and extraordinarily 
able to understand the complexities of public service management 
(Learmonth, Martin, & Warwick, 2009). 
 
3.5 Such concerns are often expressed as being about representation. Pitkin’s 
(1967) account of representation explains the distinction between different 
types. For present purposes the most relevant types are: 
• Formal representation: representation requiring formal acts of authorisation 
(for example by election) and accountability (for example by regular re-
election).  
• Descriptive representation: representation requiring that those people 
representing the public exactly resemble them in (demographic) 
characteristics (for example, the use of a ‘statistically representative sample’ 
in a survey).  
• Representation as ‘acting for’: representation which entails speaking and 
acting on behalf of a given constituency, regardless of mode of appointment 
or demographic characteristics (for example, an appointed employee 
representative on a Health Board).  
Any given public involvement mechanism will involve one or more of these 
types of representation, but it is helpful to distinguish between making a Board 
more descriptively representative of the population, or strengthening formal 
representation by making the Board answerable to the public. 
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Why? 
3.6 Concerns to involve the public are often particularly acute in systems with a 
health service funded by general taxation and provided by the state. In private 
or social insurance systems, patients are more likely to be able to express 
their preferences via ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1970), simply, by taking their business 
elsewhere. Nonetheless it is possible to distinguish two rationales for public 
involvement within a National Health Service. Martin (2008) describes these 
as democratic, or technocratic. Technocratic rationales suggest that 
empowered service users make better decisions for the public service in 
question, particularly as health professionals are recognised as fallible, and 
the citizenry as increasingly well-educated and with greater access to 
information (Coulter, 2002). Democratic rationales assert that as a tax-funded 
universal public service, health services should be accountable to the 
citizenry, whether via their elected representatives or through specially 
designed public involvement. Abelson and Eyles (2004) suggest a third 
rationale for participation in health care specifically, which is the development 
of more educated (and, implicitly, more responsible) service users.  
 
Conclusion 
3.7  These debates highlight the complexity of public involvement in health bodies. 
There are many potential models of involvement, groups to involve, and 
indeed aims for involvement. There is no clearly superior option and there will 
be trade-offs involved in the decisions. For example, time-consuming methods 
might produce more accountability but exclude the time-poor, majoritarian 
democracy might not represent minority opinions, and broad-based 
‘engagement’ might include much of the population but offer little 
empowerment. The goal of greater public participation needs to be defined 
with some specificity, and matched with appropriate mechanisms to avoid 
disappointment. 
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4 ELECTED HEALTH BODIES 
 
4.1  This section reviews the evidence on elections to health bodies. The evidence 
on elected health bodies in Canadian provinces is patchy. There is more 
comprehensive evidence on England and New Zealand, and in these cases 
evidence will be summarised under the following headings:  
• the elections  
• the relationship between the Board and the public  
• the level of influence elected members had  
• evidence relating to elected Board effectiveness.  
 
Canada: Regional Health Authorities 
4.2 Canadian health services have a long history of public participation, and there 
is an extensive body of evidence from various periods. As part of a major 
programme of ‘regionalisation’ during the 1990s, all the Canadian provinces 
except Ontario devolved more decision-making power to local organisations. 
One of the main goals of this process was enhanced public involvement 
(Maddalena, 2006), and in many cases this involved considering elected 
Boards at regional level. However only a few provinces actually instituted 
elections, and all have since abandoned them for appointed Boards. Reasons 
given for this include the financial costs of elections and the need to ensure a 
particular skills mix on Boards. One commentator summarised the Canadian 
experience with elected Boards thus: 
“On one hand, such elections will not fracture accountabilities 
but will increase democracy. On the other hand, elections 
constitute an expensive additional process that will hardly 
change board outcomes and, besides, 10% voter turnout is not 
really democracy.” (Lomas, 2001, p. 356) 
One 1999 Canadian study commissioned to advise on governance models for 
new health bodies concluded strongly: 
“Preference for appointed members over elected members is 
overwhelming, in the specialized literature as well as in the 
opinions of key informants. The only question is whether 
appointments should be made by central authorities, by the 
board itself, or both ways.” (Forest, Gagnon, Abelson, Turgeon, 
& Lamarche, 1999, p. 4) 
 
4.3 While Canada’s experiments with elected Boards are much discussed, it has 
been a struggle to identify primary research evidence. The research that does 
exist struggles to distinguish effects of election from the wider context of health 
reforms. Four provinces other than Saskatchewan have had elected Health 
Boards. However no primary research evidence was identified on these cases. 
New Brunswick had elected Regional Health Authorities between 2004 and 
2008. In the 2004 election, 110 candidates stood for 53 positions. 74.5% of 
candidates, and 72% of those elected, were male. Election turnout was 47% 
(Office of the Municipal Electoral Officer, 2004). In 2008, after only one 
election, the Regional Health Authorities were merged into a smaller number of 
RHAs with fully appointed Boards in 2008. The decision was justified by the 
need for particular skills for Board membership  
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“In keeping with the best practices in corporate governance and 
the greater need for specific expertise to manage the 
significantly enlarged RHA organizations, the board members 
of the new RHAs will be selected on the basis of required skills 
and competencies as well as geographic, linguistic and gender 
considerations.” (Province of New Brunswick, 2008, p. 22)  
Alberta’s Regional Health Authorities had 2/3 elected and 1/3 appointed 
members from 2001 but since 2004 all members have been appointed by the 
Minister (Government of Alberta, 2004).  Quebec’s Regional Health and 
Social Service Boards were elected until 2001 (Abelson et al., 2002). Prince 
Edward Island elected its Regional Health Authorities until their dissolution in 
2005 (Elections Prince Edward Island, 2009; PEI Health Governance Advisory 
Council, 2009). 
 
Saskatchewan 
4.4 Saskatchewan created Regional Health Authorities in 1992 and moved to a 
system of partially elected Boards in 1995. Two thirds of each Board were 
elected on a ward basis, and one third appointed. Three elections took place, 
at the same time as municipal elections.  
 
Year Acclaimed candidates  
(no election due to lack of candidates) 
Voter turnout District election costs 
(GBP)1 
1995 30% (69/232) 33% 477,748 
1997 68% (85/125) 25% 244,439 
1999 65% (82/127) 10% 242,656 
Table 2: elections for Saskatchewan RHAs: candidates, turnout, costs (Saskatchewan Health, 2001, p. 
59). 
4.5 There were concerns about elected Boards being captured by sectional 
interests who would make decisions against the general good of the population 
(Lomas, 2001). The Saskatchewan model was unusual for its decision to 
neither prohibit nor discourage health care providers standing as candidates: 
47% of Lewis et al’s survey of Board members were or previously had worked 
for a health care provider (S. J. Lewis, et al., 2001). However there was no 
evidence that elections had particularly politicised the Boards. 25% of 
respondents felt that their role was most like that of a school board member, 
compared to 14% who felt it was most like a member of a legislature (S. J. 
Lewis, et al., 2001). 91% of respondents indicated that they would support a 
decision they believed to be right, even if it were opposed by the community, 
and 30% felt that their input to the Board was not strongly influenced by people 
in the community (S. J. Lewis, et al., 2001). A significant majority of 
respondents felt mostly accountable to all resident in the district (76% of 
respondents): but elected members were more likely than appointed members 
to feel most accountable to residents of their ward (S. J. Lewis, et al., 2001). 
Overall, Lewis et al (2001, p. 346) found  
“surprisingly few differences in perception between elected and 
appointed members”.  
                                            
1 Converted from Canadian dollars at 17th September 2010 exchange rate for illustrative purposes (£1 
= $1.61) 
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4.6 Frustration about a lack of Board autonomy was a notable finding. 76% of all 
respondents (82% of elected and 64% of appointed members) agreed that 
Boards were legally responsible for things over which they had insufficient 
control, and 64% of elected respondents agreed they had less authority than 
they had expected when districts were formed (S. J. Lewis, et al., 2001).  
 
4.7 One research project on the experience of the Saskatchewan elected Boards 
concluded that  
“Neither the worst fears nor the highest hopes have been 
realised” (S. J. Lewis, et al., 2001, p. 347).  
 
 In 2001 it was announced that the overall number of RHAs would be reduced, 
and their Boards would be fully appointed. The announcement was explained 
as follows:  
“This system has been costly and not very popular. With few 
candidates coming forward for elected positions, and poor voter 
turnout, board elections have not proven to be an effective way 
to involve the public.” (Saskatchewan Health, 2001, p. 59) 
 
England: Foundation Trust Boards of Governors 
4.8 Foundation Trusts (FTs) were created in 2004. They have an unusual 
governance structure consisting of a membership made up of local people, 
who then elect a Board of Governors (UK Department of Health, 2009). Policy 
documents described this structure as modelled on “co-operative and mutual 
traditions”, but commentators argue there is no evidence that FTs have fulfilled 
this brief (Allen et al., 2012; Wright, Dempster, Keen, Allen, & Hutchings, 
2011). FTs operate under ‘earned autonomy’, with their Board of Directors held 
to account by this Board of Governors, rather than the Strategic Health 
Authority (Dixon, Storey, & Rosete, 2010). Each Foundation Trust has 
discretion in how to arrange both membership and elections, resulting in 
considerable diversity of method and Board structure (Day & Klein, 2005). 
However certain statutory provisions exist (House of Commons - Health 
Committee, 2008) including: 
• Governors appoint the Chair and non-executive members to the Board of 
Directors 
• Governors can dismiss the Chief Executive with a 75% vote 
• Boards of Governors consist of a majority of elected members (both staff 
and public/patient) and a minority of appointed stakeholder members (from 
Primary Care Trusts etc).  
Ham and Hunt (2008) found considerable variation in Boards of Governors. 
Their study of six FTs found sizes varying from 21 to 50, with most around 30 
members.  
 
Elections 
4.9 As FTs can define their own model of membership and election it is difficult to 
draw conclusions about the finer details of models. In research conducted as 
recently as 2011, FTs reported an ongoing process of development of their 
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representative structures (Allen, et al., 2012). Day and Klein’s (2005) study of 
the first year of FTs identified a range of options 
• whether to use constituencies or not (and type – whether geographical or of 
interest)  
• electoral system (although most used Single Transferable Vote)  
• the age of eligibility of membership (from none at all to 18).   
One FT chose to use an ‘opt-out’ model of membership – all local residents 
were automatically members unless they chose to opt-out – which created an 
unusually large membership, and an unusually low election turnout (Day & 
Klein, 2005).  
Election turnout has fallen from  48% average in 2004, to 25% in 2011 
(Monitor, Electoral Reform Research, & Member Engagement Services, 2011). 
One study noted that specialist FTs (such as the Royal Marsden) tend to 
achieve higher election turnouts (Ipsos MORI, 2008). The number of 
candidates per seat has fallen slightly, and the number of uncontested 
elections has increased from 24% to 47% between 2004 and 2011 (Monitor, et 
al., 2011). 
In terms of the characteristics of Governors elected, Day and Klein’s early 
study noted high numbers of retired Governors and of Governors who have at 
some point worked in the NHS (Day & Klein, 2005).  
 
Public engagement 
4.10 The public role of Governors is slightly unclear. In one survey, 28% of 
Governors who responded hadn’t been involved in any ‘engagement’ activities 
(Ipsos MORI, 2008).  In two studies, the question of whether Governors should 
hold surgeries (in the way an MP or councillor might) had arisen (Ham & Hunt, 
2008; R. Lewis & Hinton, 2008). Ham and Hunt (2008) found that while in 
some FTs governors were holding constituency meetings, these tended to 
attract only small numbers of the public. In other FTs governors had not felt 
confident or knowledgeable enough to do so, and in some the FT had taken 
the view that governors should not hold surgeries (Ham & Hunt, 2008). Allen et 
al (2011) found evidence of informal links between governors and the public 
membership, such as visits to community fairs, and found that governors often 
saw themselves as a conduit between public and organisation (Wright, et al., 
2011).  
 
4.11 Both Lewis and Hinton (2008) and the Healthcare Commission (2005) found 
that the new governance arrangements had encouraged FTs to be more open 
to the public, including holding well-attended public meetings. One study found 
that FTs made significant investments of time and money and energy to 
engage with its membership (Allen, et al., 2012). However the Healthcare 
Commission also commented that too few FTs had made specific efforts to 
engage traditionally poorly represented groups (Healthcare Commission, 2005, 
p. 9), and criticised the practice of FTs moving to hold their Board of Director 
meetings in private (Healthcare Commission, 2005, p. 40).  
 
4.12 Three studies highlighted the confusion caused by multiple channels of public 
influence (via membership, Governors, Public and Patient Involvement 
Forums/LINks and local authority Overview and Scrutiny Committees) (Dixon, 
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et al., 2010; Ham & Hunt, 2008; Healthcare Commission, 2005). Ham and 
Hunt (2008) argued that the removal of other channels would strengthen the 
role of members and Governors, but reported that some interviewees within 
FTs saw multiple routes of public influence as an advantage.  
 
Influence 
4.13 The studies by Dixon, Storey and Rosete (2010) and Lewis and Hinton (2008) 
agree that Governors have not played a very influential role. Allen et al (2012) 
highlight very mixed views from Governors on their own influence, ranging 
from having more influence than expected, to feeling excluded from key 
business and not given access to papers. However Dixon, Storey and Rosete 
(2010) and Ham and Hunt (2008) agree that the statutory powers of 
Governors, especially around appointments and dismissal, ‘protect’ their 
status. The potentially large number of Governors on any given Board 
suggests that Boards of Governors are intended as  advisory, not decision-
making bodies (Day & Klein, 2005). Lewis and Hinton agree, and point out the 
challenges of evaluating an aim as modest as Boards of Directors ‘listening to’ 
their Governors (R. Lewis & Hinton, 2008).  
 
4.14 As well as elected Governors internal influence, several studies highlight the 
extent to which FTs are limited by their external accountabilities (Klein, 2003). 
Formally, FTs are accountable not only to their Board of Governors but, in the 
terms adopted by Dixon, Storey and Rosete (2010)  
• ‘vertically’ to Parliament  
• ‘diagonally’ to both Monitor and the Care Quality Commission  
• ‘horizontally’ to LINks and Overview and Scrutiny Committees .  
The same study found that in practice, Strategic Health Authorities also 
continued to hold FTs to account informally, and concluded: 
“Contrary to the major policy objectives of giving greater 
autonomy to FTs and making them more accountable to the 
local population, FTs continue to look up rather than down.” 
(Dixon, et al., 2010, p. 88) 
 
Effectiveness  
4.15 The role of the Board of Governors is different from that of a more familiar 
Board of Directors. In their case study Lewis and Hinton found that Governors 
performed a range of roles, but were not involved in day-to-day management 
(R. Lewis & Hinton, 2008). One Board Chair categorised potential activities as 
guardianship, ambassadorial, statutory/constitutional and advisory (Ham & 
Hunt, 2008). In a later study, it was found that governors were basically 
effective in fulfilling their role in holding directors to account (Wright, et al., 
2011). Lewis and Hinton found some disagreement between Governors and 
Directors over their appropriate role in decision-making, with some Governors 
keen to take strategic control, while others, and most Directors, preferred the 
Board of Governors to focus on ‘patient experience’ (R. Lewis & Hinton, 2008). 
Day and Klein’s early study identified some “meddling” with operational 
matters such as car parking and cleanliness, and suggest that this may be 
inevitable given Governors’ likely concern with the ‘end product’ of patient 
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experience (Day & Klein, 2005). Governors have a fairly hands-off role, with 
most choosing not to attend meetings of the Board of Directors (Ham & Hunt, 
2008). Only 20% of Governors attend ‘all or most’ meetings of the Board 
(Ipsos MORI, 2008). Elected Governors attend more meetings than appointed 
(stakeholder) members (Ipsos MORI, 2008).  
 
4.16 Turning to Governors’ own assessment of their effectiveness, 27% declined to 
answer the survey question ‘What would you say have been your main 
achievements as a Governor?’ This is interpreted by the report’s authors as 
uncertainty (Ipsos MORI, 2008). In another question Governors listed 
improved communication and better engagement as the main improvements to 
the FT (although only 7% and 6% respectively agreed) (Ipsos MORI, 2008). 
However Governors were happy with the support they received from their FT. 
90% of respondents felt that their Trust kept them very well or well informed 
and find the Board of Directors approachable (Ipsos MORI, 2008), and 77% 
were very or fairly satisfied with the training and induction they had been 
offered (Ipsos MORI, 2008). 
 
4.17 Ham and Hunt reported some initial tension between Governors and Directors 
around the role of Governors in appointments and remuneration, but found that 
FTs tended to move past this (Ham & Hunt, 2008). Ipsos MORI reported one 
Chair doubting whether Governors were ‘up to’ the job of selecting Non-execs, 
considering them to be ‘amateurish’ (Ipsos MORI, 2008). All studies agree that 
the role of Chair (a dual role chairing both the Board of Governors and of 
Directors) is particularly crucial to the success of FT governance (Ham & Hunt, 
2008).  
 
4.18 The Healthcare Commission report also found that many Non-Executive 
Directors felt that the existence of elected governors relieved Directors of the 
responsibility of “representing the local community”, and left them able to focus 
on strategic decision-making (Healthcare Commission, 2005, p. 42). The Audit 
Commission (2009, p. 2) agreed that  
“the introduction of FTs has generally reinvigorated governance 
processes and resulted in the recruitment of non-executives 
with a greater knowledge of effective risk management and 
board challenge drawn from private sector experience.”  
 
New Zealand: District Health Boards 
4.19 District Health Boards are responsible for arranging all health services for their 
populations, and additionally own and manage public hospitals. Direct 
elections to District Health Boards were instituted in 2000 (New Zealand 
Ministry of Health, 2010). There had previously been directly elected Area 
Health Boards for a spell in the 1980s (Cumming & Mays, 2002); the switches 
away from this model, and back again, were driven by changes of Government 
(Ashton, 2001; Ashton, Mays, & Devlin, 2005). District Health Boards have up 
to 11 members, seven of whom are elected and four appointed by the Minster 
of Health, with the intention of enhancing the skill base and community 
representation of the Board. Through this mechanism, it is ensured that at 
least two Board members are of Maori origin. It is stated in the legislation that 
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although Board members are elected, their primary accountability is to the 
Minster for Health. The 2000 Act created additional duties for Boards to hold 
Board meetings in public and to consult on strategic items (Tensenbel, 
Cumming, Ashton, & Barnett, 2008). 
 
Elections 
4.20 The model of elections has changed across the elections, with Single 
Transferable Vote (STV) optional in 2001 and then compulsory from 2004 
(Gauld, 2005). In the first election (2001) a high number of candidates stood 
(Gauld, 2011). This has dropped off significantly in the next two. Gauld states 
that there is no clear reason for this, but proposes disenchantment with the 
system, or simply a reduction in the initial excitement as potential explanations. 
80% of incumbents stood again in 2004 (Gauld, 2011). Election turnout has 
remained fairly high, dropping to 43% in 2007 but increasing again to 49% in 
2010 (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011).2
 
  
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Voter turnout (%) 50 46 43 49 
Candidates per seat 7.4 3.5 2.9 2.7 
Table 3: New Zealand DHB elections: turnout and candidate numbers (Department of Internal Affairs, 
2011) 
 
4.21 Gauld suggests that the influence of postal voting contributes to these strong 
results. Gauld’s 2007 post-election survey explored non-voters’ rationales, and 
found the most common reasons were  
• ‘don’t know’ (35%)  
• ‘didn’t know about elections’ (19%)  
• ‘didn’t receive voting papers’ (12%)  
• ‘no interest in elections’ (17%)  
Interestingly, the proportion choosing ‘no interest in elections’ had fallen from 
30% in 2004. In 2007 voters made their decisions on candidates by  
• using candidate profiles (64%)  
• looking for someone they know (27%)  
Only 3% had ‘guessed’. The qualities sought in a candidate have remained 
fairly stable across the three elections, with healthcare experience proving 
most popular (56% in 2007) and management or finance experience far less 
so (7% in 2007) (Gauld, 2011).  
 
4.22 Representation of the Maori population is a major issue in New Zealand. Four 
members of DHBs are appointed, and this is intended in part to deal with 
under-representation of Maoris through elections (Gauld, 2011). Maori 
representation through the elections did improve after the full introduction of 
STV in 2004 (Barnett & Clayden, 2007). This followed a Government 
campaign to encourage Maori to stand as candidates and vote (Alliston & 
                                            
2 It is important to note that New Zealand turnout figures include blank, spoiled, and invalid papers 
which are returned. The numbers casting valid ballots are significantly smaller. It is also common for 
electors to be asked to vote in several different elections on the same ballot paper. For example, an 
elector may be asked to vote for Health Board members on the same piece of paper as for a local 
mayor and councillors; this is likely to affect turnout. 
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Cossar, 2006). Nonetheless the proportion of elected members of Maori 
ethnicity was 8% in 2004 and 2007 (Gauld, 2011). The total population 
identifying as Maori in the 2006 census was 14.6% (Statistics New Zealand, 
2006).  
 
Public engagement 
4.23 Barnett and Clayden found that the combination of elected members and 
public Board meetings did prompt a cultural change towards openness 
(Barnett & Clayden, 2007). Although interviewees acknowledged that speaking 
out in public could compromise Board members, they felt this was part of 
learning a new way of working. Board meetings became slower moving, with 
the need to explain and reiterate for members of the public present (Barnett & 
Clayden, 2007). 
 
4.24 Barnett and Clayden found that Boards had very variable ways of engaging 
with their public. Methods included a public right to speak at Board meetings, 
and public road shows (Barnett & Clayden, 2007). In addition, DHBs were 
encouraged to create special mechanisms to consult with their Maori 
population, including agreements with existing Maori bodies (Alliston & Cossar, 
2006) (Boulton, Simonsen, Walker, Cumming, & Cunningham, 2004). However 
where community engagement had improved, Barnett and Clayden found no 
evidence that this was as a direct result of elected members (Barnett & 
Clayden, 2007). Gauld similarly concludes that  
“the New Zealand experience … indicates that electoral 
mechanisms may play only a limited role in promoting 
participation, and could possibly counter public 
involvement…an elected board may be but one of multiple, 
parallel methods for public participation.” (Gauld, 2011, p. 9) 
 Tenbensel et al agree, arguing that  
“responsiveness to central government strategies has far 
outweighed the representation of local communities in decision 
making” (Tenbensel, Mays, & Cumming, 2011, p. 245). 
 
Influence 
4.25 Although Barnett and Clayden found some evidence of elected members 
having to struggle with management to gain access to strategic decision-
making (Barnett & Clayden, 2007), the literature clearly suggests that the main 
barriers to the effective influence of elected members are constraints imposed 
on Boards by central Government. Despite Boards spending time on 
prioritisation exercises, one study found 
“DHBs often lacked confidence that they could act on 
prioritisation even if they wanted to, because they would not get 
such decisions past central government and/or the local 
community.” (Tensenbel, et al., 2008) 
Gauld found that some elected members presented themselves to their 
constituents as mere “Government messengers” (Gauld, 2011). Barnett and 
Clayden similarly emphasise a lack of scope for District Health Boards to 
exert strategic direction (Barnett & Clayden, 2007), and Ashton discusses 
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situations where Ministers have reversed DHB decision, undermining elected 
members (Ashton, 2005). Most Board members see planning as developing a 
local version of national strategic plans (Tensenbel, et al., 2008), and 
accordingly influence is more likely to be over issues around service design 
and delivery. The consensus seems to be that the shift to local decision-
making has been outweighed by other policy trends:  
“Despite the formal organisational shift to local (i.e. DHB level) 
decision-making, the pressure in the opposite direction to hold 
local agencies accountable for their use of public funds has, if 
anything, increased over time.” (Ashton, et al., 2005) 
 
Effectiveness 
4.26 The literature identifies a steep learning curve for new elected members. Chief 
Executive Officers reported a lack of technical skills in some cases, with 
particular gaps around financial management (Barnett & Clayden, 2007). 
However they also stated that they valued new members’ strong networks and 
community contacts (Barnett & Clayden, 2007). Chairs talked about the hard 
work put in to equip new members with the necessary skills, and Barnett and 
Clayden conclude that  
“While Boards may not be seen to have the necessary skills, 
and the ability to fill those skills gaps through appointment was 
constrained, the notion of Board development is strongly 
present. When accompanied by good leadership and 
supportive management the capability of the Boards can clearly 
be raised to appropriate levels.” (Barnett & Clayden, 2007) 
While there is some evidence of early tensions between management and 
elected members, with the careful management of Chairs, effective team-
working was achieved in most cases (Barnett & Clayden, 2007) 
 
4.27 Elections to health bodies have been held in a number of systems: in some 
Canadian provinces in the 1990s; in New Zealand in the 1980s and again 
since 2000; and for Foundation Trusts in England since 2004. Voter turnout for 
these elections is generally disappointing, and tends to fall over time, along 
with numbers of candidates. The extent to which elected members engage 
with the public varies, but in some cases the presence of an elected Board 
seems to encourage organisational openness and transparency. Elected 
members often have a different skill-set from previously appointed members, 
and experience a steep learning curve. Notably, in each instance of elections, 
research has found that elected members are surprised and often frustrated by 
the lack of autonomy their boards have from central government control. 
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5 NON-ELECTORAL MODELS 
 
5.1 Health systems have used methods other than direct election to try to make 
Boards more representative of the public. Two common models are appointed 
representatives on Boards and advisory committees (Frankish, Kwan, Ratner, 
Wharf Higgins, & Larsen, 2002). There is limited empirical evidence on 
alternative appointment processes. There is more evidence on advisory bodies, 
particularly from UK health systems and Canadian provinces. Three models from 
within the UK are also discussed in this chapter, chosen to illustrate contrasting 
models.  
 
Board appointments 
Quebec: hospital Boards 
5.2 In the 1970s, Quebec attempted to democratise the Boards of its hospitals by 
setting quotas for the representation of different groups on its Boards. This 
was to include two patients, two representatives from local business or civic 
organisations, four members of the hospital’s Corporation (often former Board 
members), one health professional (nurse), one physician, and one member of 
non-professional staff (Eakin, 1984). 
 
5.3 In the resulting Boards the percentage of members with a background in 
business and finance declined from 56% before the reforms to 17% afterwards 
(Eakin, 1984).  One study of the reforms found that technical decisions 
became slower because there were more perspectives present, and 
administrators (managers) felt that new members lacked basic committee and 
administrative skills (Eakin, 1984). Much of the decision-making shifted away 
from meetings of the full Board to individual contacts and social environments 
(for example, the local golf club) where the new ‘lay’ representatives on the 
Board weren’t present (Eakin, 1984).  
 
England: Primary Care Trust Boards 
5.4 In June 2009 the Government set targets that for all new public appointments, 
including for the Boards of Primary Care Trusts: 
•  50% should be women,  
• 14% should be disabled people,  
• and 11% should be Asian, Black or Minority Ethnic (Appointments 
Commission, 2010b).  
The Appointments Commission uses a number of approaches to increase the 
diversity of members of local NHS Boards in England. Research with existing 
female public appointees suggested that a lack of time was one of the greatest 
challenges faced, and identified factors that attracted women to apply 
(Appointments Commission, 2009). A new advertising strategy for candidates 
was designed with these findings in mind (Appointments Commission & 
Department of Health, 2010). Other techniques have included maintaining a 
database of “near hit” candidates who aren’t initially successful, in the hope of 
supporting them into later opportunities (Appointments Commission & 
Department of Health, 2010). No primary research was identified on this 
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process, and the Appointments Commission statistics on application and 
appointment do not show significant improvement across the categories of 
diversity at this early stage (Appointments Commission, 2010a). Subject to the 
passage of current NHS reforms in England, the Appointments Commission, 
which has been responsible for these campaigns, will be abolished in October 
2012.  
 
Advisory bodies 
England: Community Health Councils 
5.5  Community Health Councils were created in the 1974 reorganisation of the 
NHS to formalise public involvement (or ‘consumer representation’) while 
separating it from the day-to-day running and management of health services 
(Klein & Lewis, 1976). These independent bodies were set up “to represent the 
views of the consumer” (Great Britain Ministry of Health and Social Security, 
1970), with their membership appointed by local authorities, Regional Health 
Authorities and local voluntary organisations.  
 
5.6  CHCs had a wide remit, including collecting information from users and 
collecting information about services; for example by commissioning small-
scale local research (Ham, 1980). Area Health Authorities had to consult their 
CHCs about proposed hospital closures (and if they agreed, there was no 
need for approval from the Secretary of State).  There was great variety in the 
actual activities of CHCs, with one national survey suggesting five roles in 
practice, ranging from closely cooperative “Health Authority Partner Councils” 
to “Independent Challengers”, who were mostly excluded from decision-
making (Lupton, Buckland, & Moon, 1995). Overall, CHCs were not found to 
have a great impact on their Health Authorities (Lupton, et al., 1995). As early 
as 1975, one survey of health service administrators found that: 
“Administrators felt that CHCs had power without responsibility; 
that they were unrepresentative; and that they were unwilling to 
do the background work on problems referred to them.” (Ham, 
1980, p. 295) 
As the NHS was reorganised, various other units were increasingly seen as 
representing service users (Pickard, 1997). CHCs were eventually abolished in 
2003. 
 
England: Local Involvement Networks (LINks) 
5.7  In 2008, new organisations known as LINks began operating in every local 
authority area in England. Their aim is “to provide flexible ways for 
communities to engage with health and social care organisation in ways that 
best suit the communities and the people in them” (NHS National Centre for 
Involvement, 2007). A key element of this model is the attempt to create space 
for involvement across the whole patient pathway, including primary, 
secondary and social care.  
One evaluation of so-called ‘early adopter’ sites, which began to develop their  
LINks in 2007 found that;  
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• LINks felt under-funded. Initial costs of setting up the networks varied from 
£3412 to £10949 excluding staff costs. 
• Some actors were concerned that Local Authorities would try to control the 
LINks (Taylor & Tritter, 2007) 
A later research project found that LINks were largely doing a good job of 
outreach and had achieved a fairly demographically diverse membership, but 
that they were felt to be lacking strategic vision for their activities (Dorfman, 
Batty, Campbell, Chapman, & Newman, 2010). 
Both of these reports are largely concerned with setting up new LINks, and 
there is a lack of research evidence about the working of this model. Some 
commentary discusses the options available for the governance of LINks 
(namely the choice between a network model, a steering group model, or a 
combination of the two) but is not based on empirical research with LINks 
(Mullen, Hughes, & Vincent-Jones, 2011). Current proposed reforms of the 
NHS in England include LINks changing to local ‘HealthWatch’ organisations 
(Wise, 2011). 
 
Scotland: Public Partnership Forums 
5.8  Public Partnership Forums have existed since 2004, when they were required 
in every Community Health Partnership (CHP) in Scotland. The model is one 
of local flexibility but statutory guidance defines three roles: 
• “ensure that the CHP is able through the PPF and other means to inform 
local people about the range and location of services and information which 
the CHP is responsible for” 
• “engage local service users, carers and the public in discussion about how 
to improve health services” 
• “support wider public involvement in planning and decision making and to 
seek to make public services more responsive and accountable to citizens 
and local communities” (Scottish Executive, 2004) 
 
5.9  Identified research evidence on Public Partnership Forums is limited to a 
report commissioned by the Scottish Health Council and published in 2007 
(FMR Consulting, 2008). This report found that PPFs became established 
quickly, particularly where they had been built on existing structures. However 
much of their activity focussed on establishing their own structures. The report 
authors found that substantial variation in form of Forum  
“reflects the diverse geographical and social make up of 
different areas, different existing community involvement 
structures and also different attitudes towards public 
involvement.” (FMR Consulting, 2008, p. 99)  
Most PPF members had previously been involved in other community/ 
voluntary sector activities, and this was a cause for concern from some 
quarters. However the report authors also highlighted the depth of experience 
and knowledge this gave to Forums. Lack of awareness of PPFs in the wider 
public was seen as a key challenge, but most PPF members felt they had 
good relationships with their Community Health and Care Partnership and 
were being listened to. 
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5.10 Instead of holding direct elections for members of health bodies, some 
systems have sought to improve public representation by making changes to 
the recruitment and appointment process for Board members, or by creating 
forums for members of the public to advise conventionally-appointed Boards. 
Appointed Boards in Quebec were given quotas for representation of different 
groups in the 1970s, but the impact of these appointees was found to be 
limited. Boards of Primary Care Trusts in England have had targets for the 
representation of different groups since 2009, and there is a lack of research 
on how effective this has been. Advisory bodies have been a common feature 
of health systems in the UK, although research evidence is largely concerned 
with Community Health Councils, which were abolished in 2003. As advisory 
bodies are generally self-selecting groups, they may not be seen as 
representing the public. Evidence suggests that it can be challenging for these 
groups to strike a balance between conducting outreach and public 
engagement work, or working to influence Boards on strategic matters. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Public involvement is a particular challenge for health services which are 
provided by the state and funded by general taxation. A wide range of models 
and activities exist, and each will have particular strengths and weaknesses in 
different settings. This literature review presents research evidence on 
methods of improving public representation on Health Boards: direct elections, 
alternative modes of appointment, and advisory committees. While there is a 
substantial literature on these topics, it does not necessarily offer evidence 
neatly packaged to inform policy-making. As others have acknowledged 
(Barnett & Clayden, 2007), the primary research on Board elections mostly 
focuses on the views of Board members and so it is difficult to identify wider 
impacts. This reflects a broader preoccupation in the literature with accounts of 
process rather than assessments of outcomes (Mitton, Smith, Peacock, Evoy, 
& Abelson, 2009). Even where research looks at outcomes, the absence of 
objective measures of community engagement, and the problems with 
attributing outcomes to specific initiatives, mean that conclusions are rarely as 
clear as we might like (S. J. Lewis et al., 2001).  
 
6.2 The most directly comparable examples of direct elections to health bodies are 
some Canadian Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), New Zealand District 
Health Boards (DHBs), and Foundation Trusts in England. Evidence from 
these systems suggests that elections are not in themselves sufficient to 
ensure a high quality or quantity of public involvement. However once in place, 
fears that elected Boards will harm health services due to a lack of experience 
or to ‘political interference’ do not appear to have been realised. Indeed, once 
in place, elected Board members have similar views to appointed Boards. 
However the more public role of elected Board members can raise 
expectations about the degree of influence they have. Boards often focus 
mainly on day-to-day management, with strategic policy-making remaining with 
central or provincial Government. In both New Zealand and Canada elected 
members were frustrated by these limitations on their influence. Where 
elections have been tried and then abandoned, as in Saskatchewan, it has 
generally been justified by reference to low turnout and financial cost, rather 
than to evidence of problems with Board functioning.  
 
6.3  One alternative to elections is to alter how Board members are recruited and 
appointed. There is a lack of research evidence on these techniques, but 
models which have been used include: 
• Quotas (Quebec hospital boards in the 1970s, New Zealand District Health 
Boards) or targets (Primary Care Trust Boards in England) for the 
representation of particular groups on Boards. 
• Rethinking advertising campaigns and supporting ‘near hit’ candidates to 
reapply (Primary Care Trust Boards in England) 
 
6.4  There are many examples of advisory bodies in the UK and in Canada, 
including Scotland’s current system of Public Partnership Forums. Some 
themes from the literature include: 
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• Advisory bodies are sometimes criticised for being weak, as by definition 
they don’t have direct decision-making control. It can be difficult to evaluate 
their level of influence. 
• As with appointed Boards, questions of representation arise repeatedly with 
advisory bodies. People with the confidence and time to take part are often 
older, and more middle class. Ethnic minorities and young people are often 
under-represented. Models of ‘drop-in drop-out’ participation such as LINks 
in the English NHS are seen as a solution to this, but have other drawbacks.  
 
6.5  International experience shows that neither elected nor advisory bodies can 
resolve all of the challenges of patient and public involvement. Problems of low 
or intermittent engagement, questions about representativeness, and the cost-
effectiveness of any given strategy are common and do not seem to have any 
one solution. 
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